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Abstract
A novel decision theory is emerging out of sparse findings in economics, math-
ematics and, most importantly, psychology and computational cognitive science.
It rejects a fundamental assumption of the theory of rational decision-making,
namely, that uncertain belief rests on independent assessment of utility and prob-
ability, and includes envisioning possibilities within its scope. Several researchers
working with these premises, independently of one another, arrived at the conclu-
sion that decision is made by highlighting the positive features of the alternative
that will be chosen while opposing it to a loosing alternative, whose unpleasant
aspects have been stressed.
This article frames together contributions from different disciplines, often un-
known to one another, with the hope of improving the coordination of research
efforts. Furthermore, it discusses the status of the novel theory with respect to our
current idea of rationality.
Keywords: Rationality, Shackle, Shafer, Search for Dominant Structure, Differen-
tiation – Consolidation, Constraint Satisfaction Networks, Construction of Narratives,
Construction of Strategies.
JEL classification: D80, D89.
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A famished fox, when she saw grapes hanging from a vine, wanted
to reach them and could not. Going away, she said to herself: “They are
sour”.
Aesop, VI century B.C.
1 Introduction
According to the ancient Greek tale reported above, the fox was not smart. In fact, after
measuring the probability to reach the grapes (by jumping), she preferred to change her
evaluation of their utility (they are sour) rather than updating her probability assessment
(the grapes are too high).
The tale of the fox and the grapes entails a basic requirement of our idea of ‘ra-
tionality’, namely, that judgments about the likelihood of certain events — in modern
terms, the probabilities of the consequences of certain actions — are made indepen-
dently of judgments about the desirability of these events — in modern terms, the
utility of these consequences. On this presumption, the utilities of the consequences
of an action can be weighed by their probabilities to yield the ‘expected utility’ which,
according to the theory of rational decision-making, should be maximized in order for
a decision to be qualified as “rational”.
The theory of rational decision-making has been criticized for not providing an ad-
equate description of decision processes. However, most criticisms can be accommo-
dated by slight modifications of the basic procedure. In particular Ellsberg’s paradox
[23], which rests on differential sample sizes, can be accommodated by substituting
additive probabilities with sub-additive probabilities (see Appendix A) [32] [107] [33].
Likewise, Allais’ paradox [1], which is due to distortions caused by events with very
low probability, can be accommodated by non-linear transformations of utilities and
probabilities as prescribed by Prospect Theory (see Appendix B) [50] [139].
The case of Slovic’s paradox is quite different. A long series of experiments, even
if carried out by unsympathetic researchers, have shown that preferences between two
alternative bets can be reversed if subjects are asked to evaluate selling prices for the
two bets (e.g. a lottery ticket), rather than choosing one of them (see Appendix C) [124]
[123] [59] [125] [126] [39] [37] [60]. Other experiments have shown that the reason
is that when thinking about betting people focus on the probability to win, whereas
when thinking about selling a lottery ticket people focus on what prize can be won
(i.e., utility) [105] [75] [122] [140] [28]. Thus, it appears that human beings do not
evaluate utilities independently of probabilities, just as the fox of the tale did.
Several other contexts have been identified, where preference reversal occurs [138].
Preference reversal is destructive for the theory of rational choice. In fact, it suggests
that preferences are neither stable nor coherent. But if preferences are neither sta-
ble nor coherent, no utility function exists. Thus, preference reversal suggests that
decision-making should be viewed as problem-framing and problem-solving, rather
than optimization of a given utility function [142] [53] [121] [58]. In this perspective,
both probabilities and utilities must be discovered in the process of decision-making,
and not independently of one another [67] [2] [4].
Several attempts to reconcile preference reversal with the theory of rational choice
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have been made. Preference reversal can be accommodated with the theory of ratio-
nal choice if either violations of transitivity [61] [29], or of independence [41] [51],
or of completeness [22] of preferences are accepted. While the attempts to reconcile
preference reversal with the theory of rational decision by relaxing transitivity or in-
dependence of preferences did not receive much attention because these properties are
essential for our idea of rationality, the more recent idea of dropping completeness
deserves some discussion. In fact, allowing preferences to be incomplete amounts to
accept the idea that a utility function can be defined, at most, for some alternatives.
Possibly, just the simplest and most repetitive ones.
Thus, this stratagem actually suggests that the theory of rational decision-making
does not provide a guidance to decision-making whenever the problem to be solved is
sufficiently novel. A radically different theory of uncertain reasoning is in order, one
where judgment is not split into a utility function and a probability distribution.
By splitting judgment into a utility function and a probability distribution, the the-
ory of rational decision-making makes an enormous simplification. In fact, utility func-
tion and probability distribution are defined on the same domain, namely, the set of the
consequences of actions (henceforth, ‘set of possibilities’ or ‘possibility set’). Thus,
utilities and probabilities can be modified independently of one another if the possibil-
ity set is given. Consequently, the theory of rational decision-making can limit itself to
analyze decision-making once the possibility set, the utility function and the probabil-
ity distribution are known. And indeed, the prototypical setting of the theory of rational
decision-making is that of a gambler facing a known game, such as playing dice.
On the contrary, a theory where judgment is not split into utility and probability
should afford to include the formation of the possibility set within its scope, which
amounts to include the cognitive processes whereby possibilities are conceived, mod-
ified or forgotten. Its prototypical settings might be that of a firm revising its values
and its experience in order to conceive a strategy for an uncertain future, a Government
elaborating a long-term policy or an individual making fundamental choices for his
life. In all these cases, the content of the possibility set is not self-evident as in the case
of gambling games. It is the outcome of interpretation, and the cognitive processes that
yield this interpretation should be part of a decision theory because they do influence
decision.
Thus, in order to develop one such theory one needs to identify rationales for defin-
ing the possibilities envisioned in a human mind and for developing judgments con-
cerning them. Principles followed by the human mind when gathering information,
conceiving possibilities and making decisions.
Silently, during the last decades various scholars working in different disciplines
have made important steps in this direction. This article puts together various insights,
developed independently of one another, pointing to one single principle, namely, that
novel arrangements of the possibility set are explored by posing binary questions. By
reporting and linking these insights to one another, it provides a map to researchers in
an emerging field.
By connecting these streams to one another, it became clear that this emerging
decision theory is questioning a basic feature of our idea of rationality — the indepen-
dence of judgments of value (utility) from judgments of likelihood (probability), as it
is expressed by the tale of the fox and the winegrapes. This implication has not been
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realized by the scholars involved in this enterprise. Yet it is worth pursuing, for it has
important consequences.
This article purports that attributing ‘rationality’ to utility maximization is a cultural
artifact. In reality, foxes (and humans) may have good reasons to behave the way the
story tells. Eventually, their actual decision procedures follow sensible guidelines that
can be investigated and understood.
If these guidelines are sensible, they may not only be observed, but also prescribed.
Thus, precisely because it questions the established idea of rationality, this emerging
decision theory can aspire to both a descriptive and a normative status.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section (2) exposes some theoretical
principles that are supposed to guide the formation and destruction of possibilities in
the human mind. Section (3) illustrates the main thread of this paper, namely, the idea
that decision is made by opposing an alternative whose positive features are stressed
to an alternative whose negative features are stressed — hence, the title “Either, Or”.
Section (4) reports on a computational model of this idea. Finally, section (5) concludes
by discussing the descriptive and normative status of the decision principles outlined
in the previous sections.
2 Guiding Principles
This section collects theoretical principles that may guide the construction of a deci-
sion theory where possibilities are conceived at the same time that beliefs are formed.
My point of departure are a few statements made by the mathematician Glenn Shafer
regarding the rationale for (a) conceiving novel possibilities, and (b) for merging or
discarding possibilities. On the procedure for conceiving novel possibilities, biologist
Peter Cariani has something to say, based on a re-interpretation of Gordon Pask’s ex-
periments in the System Science of the 1950s. On merging or discarding possibilities,
the economist George Shackle first proposed that the human mind arrives at making
a decision by contrasting an attractive alternative to a detestable one. As we shall see
in the subsequent sections, a number of recent findings in experimental psychology
confirmed this idea, and a connectionist computational model suggests a possible ex-
planation.
Shafer has been the first scholar who drew attention on the entaglement between
value judgments and likelihood judgments: “My point is that the process of formulat-
ing and adopting goals creates a dependence of value [utility] and belief [probability],
simply because goals are more attractive when they are feasible.” 1 [111]. This is just
the same content as the tale of the fox and the grapes — the fox found the grapes more
attractive when she thought that that reaching them was feasible — except that Shafer
did not laugh at this feature of human nature.
Shafer’s Evidence Theory [110], also known as “theory of belief functions”, ac-
cepts that a decision-maker may be aware that the possibility set is not exhaustive [27].
This is achieved by forbidding the operation of complementation on the possibility set,
1Shafer’s theory is such that his “belief” cannot be equated to probability and his “value” cannot be
equated to utility. Nevertheless, this is a first approximation that may help the reader understand Shafer’s
quotation.
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so residual events cannot be defined. In order to stress the difference between the pos-
sibility set so modified and the one employed in Probability Theory, Shafer called the
possibility set “frame of discernment”. In the rest of this article, Shafer’s usage will be
followed.
Evidence Theory is concerned with the combination of empirical evidence stem-
ming from different sources in the human mind (e.g., a judge evaluating testimonies,
a manager evaluating scenarios, etc.). The bulk of the theory does not seek to explain
how novel possibilities are conceived, or old possibilities are merged or discarded.
However, in the last chapter of the 1976 book where Evidence Theory was first pre-
sented [110], Shafer speculated on a decision-maker who creatively builds the possi-
bilities she envisions:
Like any creative act, the act of constructing a frame of discernment
does not lend itself to thorough analysis. But we can pick out two con-
siderations that influence it: (1) we want our evidence to interact in an
interesting way, and (2) we do not want it to exhibit too much internal
conflict.
Two items of evidence can always be said to interact, but they inter-
act in an interesting way only if they jointly support a proposition more
interesting than the propositions supported by either alone. (...) Since it
depends on what we are interested in, any judgment as to whether our
frame is successful in making our evidence interact in an interesting way
is a subjective one. But since interesting interactions can always be de-
stroyed by loosening relevant assumptions and thus enlarging our frame,
it is clear that our desire for interesting interaction will incline us towards
abridging or tightening our frame.
Our desire to avoid excessive internal conflict in our evidence will have
precisely the opposite effect: it will incline us towards enlarging or loos-
ening our frame. For internal conflict is itself a form of interaction —
the most extreme form of it. And it too tends to increase as the frame is
tightened, decrease as it is loosened.
Glenn Shafer, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence [110], Ch. XII.
In order to understand the above quotation it is in order to remark that Evidence
Theory’s frame of discernment has a cognitive flavor that is foreign to Probability The-
ory’s possibility set. The frame of discernment is a mental representation of the em-
pirical evidence available to the decision-maker. Empirical evidence is classified into
mental categories, and these mental categories are the possibilities envisioned on the
frame of discernment.
By “abridging or tightening the frame” Shafer meant sectioning the empirical ev-
idence into finer mental categories in order to distinguish interesting details. The op-
posite strategy is that of “enlarging or loosening the frame”, i.e., lumping empirical
evidence into broader categories in order to oversee details that would contradict one
another. A decision theory can be constructed if general principles are identified, upon
which the cognitive processes that tighten or loosen the frame of discernment are iden-
tified.
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In order to avoid possible misunderstandings with the economically-minded reader,
it is worth to emphasize that looking for rationales for changing a frame of discernment
has nothing to do with:
• Defining a cost function against which the number of possibilities would be
traded. Although the cognitive processes whereby a frame of discernment is
changed can be subsumed ex post by an objective function with a positive term
representing the advantages of envisioning many possibilities and a negative term
representing the mental effort that they require, by assuming ex ante the existence
of one such function one would take as solved the problem that this article seeks
to solve.
• Trading the number of possibilities considered by the decision-maker with the
mistakes connected with choosing the “wrong” possibility. 2. In fact, this is
just another form of the cost function, where “mental costs” are exchanged for
“making mistakes”.
On the contrary, the following principles are relevant to the issue of tightening or
loosening the frame of discernment:
Tightening the frame of discernment entails the creative act of conceiving novel possi-
bilities. This is a difficult domain, for creativity cannot be formalized. However,
even creative acts may follow a general scheme.
In the 1950s, Gordon Pask built a series of electrochemical devices where an
electrical current formed structures that were shaped by signals that the struc-
tures themselves detected, and that would be beneficial to their growth. Through
interactions with the environment, these devices evolved an “interest” towards
particular signals to which they would attach a meaning — that of being bene-
ficial, or not. By means of these devices, Pask was able to evolve an ear and a
receptor of magnetic fields, without any of these functions being planned by the
experimenter. Such devices work if (1) they are sufficiently flexible and explo-
rative to form a large number of structures, and if (2) some of these structures
are enhanced by particular environmental signals [83] [16] [17] [18].
These conditions may be translated back into the domain of human decision-
making, suggesting that in order for novel possibilities and novel meanings to
be generated (1) a decision maker must be sufficiently flexible to apply available
knowledge onto unchartered domains, and (2) the environment must provide a
feedback that affects the decision-maker, either positively or negatively. If this
feed-back is not strong enough, a new exploration must be undertaken.
Research in the economics of innovation has shown that firms make radical inno-
vations by transposing old knowledge into new fields and subsequently reacting
to the feed-backs provided by the new field of operations — e.g., by applying
a technology that they already master on an entirely different class of products,
2R. Heiner, the initiator of this reasoning, claimed that this circumstance would lead to “predictable”
behavior. In reality, a behavior spanning a smaller possibility set may still be totally unpredictable if it is
random. Heiner’s conclusion is unjustified.
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an entirely novel product may be conceived [81]. We may recognize the two
conditions above, though since humans have the power to ignore environmental
feed-backs we may split the second condition in two parts, obtaining as con-
ditions for conceiving novel possibilities (1) a search procedure whereby novel
hypotheses are explored, (2a) an environment that provides a feed-back, and (2b)
a subject who accepts to change because of this feed-back.
Loosening the frame of discernment needs not be carried out up to a point where
all distinctions are blurred and nothing is recognized. In general, loosening the
frame of discernment means that the picture of reality is simplified until one
possibility stands out as the best conceivable solution.
George Shackle, an economist who worked at a time when the theory of rational
decision-making was still under development, outlined a decision theory that in
its verbal statements anticipated the mathematical framework that would be set
out by Shafer [25] [26]. Most interesting to us is the fact that, at the crucial point
when a decision has to be made, Shackle assumed that an individual observes
an ascendancy function that presents him the worst and the best conceivable
hypotheses, “the extremes in the desirability-undesirability ordering” in his own
wording [109].
Shackle explained “ascendancy” as “power of fascination”. The “extremes in the
desirability-undesirability ordering” were also called “focus elements”, where
“By (...) focus-element we mean an element (...) which has some special and ex-
traordinary power to command and concentrate upon itself the decision maker’s
attention.”. Shackle assumed that, for each hypothesis a decision-maker is able
to entertain, (s)he is also able to think of a neutral reference point and, from there
on, two “focus elements” with opposite values [109].
Shackle neither tested his theory, nor attempted to establish any link with theoret-
ical or applied psychology. His decision theory, made of pure verbal statements,
was forgotten in the light of the elegance and simplicity of the emerging theory
of rational decision-making. Today, while the theory of rational decision-making
is showing serious creeks, certain empirical findings in experimental psychology
are pointing to the same path identified by Shackle out of personal introspection.
This is the subject of § (3).
The above reasoning about tightening and loosening the frame of discernment
might constitute the bulk of a new emerging decision theory. Decision-making would
be viewed as composed by (i) a phase of exploration and invention of novel possibilities
(tightening the frame of discernment), and (ii) a phase where the positive features of
one alternative are emphasized and contrasted to a bad alternative (loosening the frame
of discernment). Decision-making might be viewed as a process alternatively carrying
out these two steps, back and forth as in figure (1).
All issues concerned with loosening the frame of discernment (focusing on one
possibility) are easier to handle than issues on tightening the decision frame (adding
a novel possibility). The ensuing § (3) and § (4) are concerned with focusing on one
possibility in order to arrive at a decision. However, the issue of conceiving novel pos-
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that interact with one another in interesting ways, generating conflicts.
The frame of discernment is tightened by conceiving novel possibilities
The frame of discernment is loosened by focusing on one possibility,
contrasted to a clearly inferior one. This process eliminates conflicts.
Figure 1: Tightening (i) and loosening (ii) the frame of discernment. The frame of
discernment is tightened out of a desire for interesting interactions, it is loosened out
of a desire for coherence.
sibilities will be taken back in the final § (5), which deals with issues of descriptiveness
and normativeness.
3 The Quest for Coherence
This section is concerned with theories and empirical findings that, subsequently and
independently of Shackle, have described decision-making as focusing on one alterna-
tive whose positive features have been emphasized, eventually contrasted to an alter-
native whose negative features have been emphasized. In several settings it has been
remarked that one alternative seems to attract the attention of decision-makers:
• In pure coordination games [104], players face a set of alternatives knowing that
a positive payoff will only accrue to them if they all coordinate on the same
choice. Most importantly pure coordination games are one-shot games so no
learning can take place. For instance, two subjects may be shown a city map and
asked, independently of one another, to select a meeting point. Or, subjects may
be asked to select a positive integer.
The astonishing fact about pure coordination games is that players succeed to
make an agreement much more often than would be predicted by pure chance.
The reason is that pure coordination games generally entail cues that suggest one
alternative as more “salient” than others. For instance, subjects asked to select a
meeting point generally opt for the railway station, whereas the majority of those
asked to name a positive integer select the number 1.
• Consider a rather famous research project aiming at discovering “fast and frugal
heuristics” that allow decision-makers to make good decisions with little effort
[31]. Similarly to pure coordination games, this research discovered that many
decisions are made by means of heuristics that order alternatives according to one
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single, salient aspect. Perhaps the most striking finding of this research is that
such simple heuristics let people make good decisions in many realistic decision
settings, most of the time.
• Marketing research has found out that consumer choice can be eased if only a
few product attributes are made salient [47] [64] [82] [45] [12] [44]. Apparently,
purchase is induced by manipulating the saliency of a few, or just one, product
attribute(s), rather than overall quality along several attributes. By doing so,
decision becomes a binary choice, or a short sequence of binary choices.
Coordination in pure coordination games is generally explained by ascribing saliency
either to features of the decision problem, such as the fact that the railway station is a
place where people meet or that 1 is the first positive integer. Likewise, the efficiency
of simple, one-aspect heuristics is generally ascribed to features of the decision prob-
lem. Note also that the very fact that marketers seek to manipulate saliency implies
that, similarly to the above explanations, saliency is understood as exogenous to the
decision-maker.
My point is that binary choice is common not only because world experiences come
in binary form as the aforementioned justifications imply, but also because human rea-
soning proceeds by framing decision problems as binary alternatives. On many oc-
casions, saliency may be constructed by the decision-maker in order to simplify the
decision problem until one option stands out as the only reasonable one.
The binary choices in the above examples may also be interpreted as deriving from
an innate human tendency to isolate one best alternative, rather than from objective
features of the decision problem. One may claim that railway stations would not be
chosen so often if humans would consider them along with main squares, old bridges
and city councils as possible meeting points. Or, that the number 1 would not be
chosen so often if, say, humans would start by considering all ten single-digit numbers.
A similar reasoning holds for heuristics, which do not necessarily need to focus on one
salient aspect in order to be fast. In all these cases, the prominence of one salient feature
could be ascribed to human interpretation at least as much as to objective features of
the decision problem. And the fact that marketers frame consumers’ decision problems
as binary choices may simply mean that they know human nature.
Likewise, we have seen that the preference reversals examined in § (1) can be
explained by assuming that decision-makers frame their decision problem around the
probability to win if they are asked to play the game, whereas they frame their decision
problem around the possible gains if they are asked to sell their lottery ticket. In this
case, the saliency of the probability to win and the saliency of the possible gains are
clearly constructed by the decision-maker herself [119] [76] [6]. And decision-makers
construct the saliency of only one feature at a time, either the probability to win or the
possible gains.
Empirical research has highlighted that decision-makers are eager to utilize even
trivial cues to draw sophisticated inferences and attribute causality to salient factors,
and that they do so without awareness (see [136] for a review of early studies). In
particular, decision-makers have been shown to routinely construct reasons to justify
their choices to others and to themselves, both before and after a decision is made [57]
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[112]. Post-decisional justification of decisions is undisputed in psychology, but pre-
decisional construction of reasons in order to make a choice upsets our certainties on
rationality.
Nevertheless, an increasingly wide stream of empirical research is sheding light
on pre-decisional biases. Apparently, decision-makers focus quite early on one single
alternative, spending the remaining time before decision emphasizing its positive as-
pects while denigrating the remaining alternatives [130] [65] [66] [24] [77] [7] [143]
[21] [144] [146] [99] [135] [100] [120] [101] [102] [117] [90] [62] [116] [36]. This is
extremely interesting, because it accords with Shackle’s intuition that decision-making
takes place through binary choices between one “best” and one “worst” alternative (see
§ 2). However, in Shackle’s account it was not clear that two alternatives are “the best”
and “the worst” in the sense that the human mind constructs them as such.
The above empirical evidence has been collected in conjunction with theory devel-
opment. Indeed, several psychologists have included bolstering the advantages of one
promising alternative and the disadvantages of all other alternatives among the pro-
cesses occurring during decision-making. Let us examine these theories in time order.
Mills’ Choice Certainty Theory (CCT, 1968) stated that, if decision-makers are
completely uncertain about which alternative is best, then information favoring any of
the alternatives will increase their certainty. However, if they are somewhat certain that
one alternative is best, then they will prefer information favoring that alternative [69].
CCT is important, because for the first time a decision theory admitted that the
evaluation of alternatives could be distorted in order to arrive at a decision. By com-
parison, its contemporary theory of cognitive dissonance stressed that the evaluation of
alternatives could be distorted after a decision is made in order to minimize regret, but
not before decision [14]. However, note that CCT considered the distortion of eval-
uation a consequence of biased information gathering, rather than a genuine psychic
process. So CCT did admit a pre-decisional distortion of evaluation, but actually not a
pre-decisional distortion of preferences.
Janis and Mann’s Conflict Theory (CT, 1977) of decision-making focuses on de-
cisions involving profound, eventually destructive consequences for a decision-maker
[49]. According to CT, if a decision-maker faces serious risks both in the case she
changes her course of action and in the case she does not, and if she has no hope to
find a better solution, then a state of “defensive avoidance” of decisions ensues. This
can take the form of procrastinating decision, or of shifting responsibility, or of bol-
stering the positive aspects of the least objectionable alternative. Figure (2) illustrates
the conditions leading to defensive avoidance in CT.
Janis and Mann specified under which conditions a decision-maker would resort to
defensive avoidance, and under which conditions defensive avoidance would take the
form of changing preferences. It is a real endogenous process of preference change,
triggered by specific psychic conditions. However, according to CT only in a few
special occasions the positive aspects of the least objectionable alternative would be
bolstered. CT did not take this as a main ingredient of decision-making.
Kuhl’s Theory of Action Control (TAC, 1982) postulates that an individual may find
himself in one of two different moods [54] [55]. In the mood labeled “state orientation”
an individual is excessively focused on his past, present or future state so he cannot
attend to any action plan which may bring about a change. On the contrary, in the
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mood labeled “action orientation” an individual seeks to implement an action plan
and focuses simultaneously on the present state, a desired future state, the discrepancy
between them and action alternatives which may turn the present state into the desired
state.
According to TAC, action orientation should be protected against tendencies to-
wards state orientation. TAC points to three mechanisms to keep an action orientation
going: 1) Quick termination of action-oriented decision-making in order to shield it
from state-oriented alternatives; 2) Selective attention to information that is relevant
to an action-oriented decision; 3) Emotional arousal of an action-oriented alternative.
Note that (2) is akin to pre-decisional bias as in CTT, whereas (3) implies a true change
of preferences as in CT.
The real novelty about TAC is that preference modification is no longer considered
a wrong way of reasoning, but rather a good means to achieve and maintain a desirable
orientation. Preferences are not inadvertently “distorted”, but willingly modified.
However, the open breakthrough comes with Montgomery’s Search for Dominance
Structure Theory (SDS, 1983) [71] [72] [73] [79], where emphasizing the positive
aspects of one alternative while denigrating the other alternatives is the essential step
of decision-making. SDS claims that, even without additional information, decision-
makers engage in a search for a coherent framing of available alternatives at the end of
which one of them stands out as the best one, whereas all other alternatives are depicted
in their worst aspects. SDS claims also that the “best” alternative is generally selected
quite early in the decision process, well before a decision is made. According to SDS,
most of the time employed in decision-making goes in constructing a justification for
an alternative that is actually chosen on other grounds.
SDS provides a crude description of the processes employed by a decision-maker.
Figure (3) reports their flowchart.
The distinctive block of SDS is the one where preferences are modified in order
to make one alternative dominate the others (Dominance Structuring). This block in-
cludes bolstering the positive features of one alternative, de-emphasizing the positive
features of all other alternatives, canceling alternatives from the frame of discernment,
and collapsing distinct alternatives into one broad alternative. If these operations are
carried out with sufficient skill on a sufficiently differentiated initial set of alternatives,
a decision-maker ends up contemplating one “good” alternative that has a number of
attractive features with one “bad” alternative that may actually lump together several
alternatives whose interesting features have been de-emphasized.
SDS may illustrate a search for dominance as a pure mental construction, or an
interactive process that includes a search for better information. In this second case,
decision is reached after a series of steps where the frame of discernment is alternatively
tightened and loosened.
SDS ascribes to decision-makers the ability to apply the dominance structuring
operations to an alternative that is different from the one that was initially preferred.
Furthermore, SDS contemplates the possibility of postponing decision as well as that
of not making any decision at all.
Affect and emotions are known to play an important role in the formation of pref-
erences [89]. SDS understands their role as facilitators of the process of construction
of a dominant structure [52].
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Svenson’s Differentiation-Consolidation Theory (DC, 1992) [131] [132] [133] is
quite similar to SDS. According to Svenson himself [135], the main difference is
that DC takes account of post-decisional re-evaluation of alternatives (consolidation)
besides pre-decisional evaluation (differentiation), whereas SDS, at least in its first
version, did not include post-decisional re-evaluation. However, post-decisional re-
evaluation of alternatives, i.e., a bias to confirm the goodness of any choice that has
been made, was known and accepted by the theory of cognitive dissonance long before
the empirical studies that stimulated these theories were carried out [14].
In a sense, DC may be understood as an attempt to bridge between SDS and a
compatible aspect of an otherwise radically different theory (the theory of cognitive
dissonance, which concerns post-decisional re-evaluation of alternatives, assumes ra-
tional decision-making). However, there is empirical evidence claiming that the desire
for coherence (by means of pre-decisional differentiation) is a much stronger motiva-
tion for decision-making than the desire to avoid post-decisional regret (by means of
post-decisional consolidation) [145].
Slightly after the wave of empirical research that suggested the above theories, a
parallel wave of empirical research started, that focused on group decision-making.
Jurors have been shown to arrive at a verdict by creating consensus rather than by
compromise [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [80], which means that group decision-making
is by no means a trade-off between individual preferences as the theory of rational
decision-making assumes. Group decision-making may rather follow the same pattern
as individual decision-making, with a group behaving somehow similarly to one single
mind. Jurors deciding on guilt or innocence , as well as boards of managers deciding
whether a risky investment should be made [108], have been shown to identify quite
early a preferred alternative. Tentatively, one may hypothesize that the theories that
explain individual decision-making apply to group decision-making as well.
This is makes for a sharp and notable distinction with the theory of rational decision-
making. In fact, the theory of rational decision-making is designed for one single indi-
vidual so it is not obvious that it can be applied to groups or organizations. In order to
pass from individual to group decision-making, assumptions on power structures and
interacting procedures must be made so preferences can be aggregated, and in some
cases — such as Arrow’s paradox — no rational collective decision can be made even
if individuals are supposed to be rational. On the contrary, the above studies suggest
a pattern for group decision that is quite similar to individual decision. Through con-
frontation and discussion, a coherent picture of reality is elaborated where, in the end,
one option stands out as the one sensible thing to do.
Finally, the above theories of decision-making suggest a simple explanation of
“groupthink”, i.e., the tendency of groups to fixate on a wrong course of action, iso-
lating themselves from potentially disturbing information [48]. In fact, the alternative
whose positive aspects are emphasized by the group may simply not be the best one.
Indeed, the empirical evidence testifies that while the group as a whole follows the
typical pattern of emphasizing the positive aspects of one alternative and the negative
aspects of all other alternatives, its members may have a much weaker drive to pref-
erence differentiation as group members than as single individuals [13] [70]. So the
drive to consensus that makes the above theories applicable to groups may also be
responsible of groupthink.
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4 Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Networks
Parallel constraint satisfaction networks (CSNs) [98] are neural networks characterized
by:
• Excitatory and inhibitory connections;
• Feedbacks between neurons.
Neurons represent possibilities, or concepts, or propositions. Connections repre-
sent inferences: an excitatory connection from neuron A to neuron B means “A implies
B”, whereas an inhibitory connection from neuron A to neuron B means “A implies ¬
B”.
Let ai denote the activation (the output) of neuron i, with ai ∈ ℜ. Let wi j ∈ ℜ
denote the weight by which neuron i multiplies the input arriving from neuron j.
The net excitatory input to neuron i is:
eneti = ∑
j
wi ja j i f wi ja j ≥ 0 (1)
The net inhibitory input to neuron i is:
eneti = ∑
j
wi ja j i f wi ja j < 0 (2)
At each time step, the activation of neuron i is increased by its excitatory inputs and
decreased by its inhibitory inputs:
∆ai = eneti(amax−ai)+ ineti(ai−amin) (3)
where, in general, amax = 1 and amin =−1.
Feedbacks between neurons make the network maximize consonance C:
C = ∑
i
∑
j
wi jaia j (4)
or, equivalently, minimize energy E =−C.
Consonance maximization means that those neurons are strengthened, that repre-
sent possibilities, concepts or propositions that are coherent with one another. Thus,
constraint satisfaction networks can be used to model any cognitive process character-
ized by search for coherence [43] [137]. Notable applications of CSNs are the elabo-
ration of scientific theories, understood as the arrangement of empirical findings in a
network of coherent causal relations, the evaluation of guilt or innocence in a trial, un-
derstood as fitting testimonies in a coherent frame, and the Gestalt idea that the human
mind may shift among alternative interpretations of reality.
CSNs have also been used to model post-decisional re-evaluation as in the the-
ory of cognitive dissonance (see § (3)). But most intersting to us is that CSNs can
be used to model pre-decisional emphatization of the positive aspects of one alterna-
tive at the same time that the negative aspects of its competitors are stressed [114]
[118]. In particular, some of the empirical examples mentioned in § (3) as instances of
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decision-making by emphatization of the positive aspects of one alternative, have been
reproduced by means of a CSN [42] [63].
On the whole, CSNs implement quite well the decision theories expounded in § (3).
Indeed, an experimenter working with CSNs wrote the following lines without any
acquaintance with those theories, and yet reaching strikingly similar conclusions:
Coherence-based reasoning posits that the mind shuns cognitively com-
plex and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones,
yielding strong, confident conclusions. The research reveals an uncon-
scious transformation of the way decisions are mentally represented, ul-
timately leading to a seemingly straightforward choice between a com-
pelling alternative and a weak one.
Simon, [113]: 513
CSNs can also reproduce the preference reversals mentioned in § (1) [15]. In fact, a
CSN can either reinforce the choice induced by looking at prizes, or the choice induced
by looking at the probability to win. So CSNs support the interpretation of preference
reversals presented in § (3), where preference reversals were ascribed to construction
of saliency of either the probability to win or the possible gains [119] [76] [6].
Some researchers have also emphasized the ability of CSNs to provide story-like
descriptions of reality, much like humans actually do [91]. This is extremely important,
because it supports the idea that decision-making occurs once a coherent narrative has
been constructed. In § (5) it will be shown that narrative construction is the basis for
ascribing a normative value to the emergent decision theory outlined in this article.
A clear limitation of CSNs is that they work with given possibilities, given con-
cepts, or given propositions. CSNs can reproduce the arrangement of possibilities and
concepts, not their arousal. In terms of Shafer’s theoretical guiding principles men-
tioned in § (2), CSNs give us a hint of the processes by which the frame of discernment
loosened, but say nothing on the procedures by which it may eventually be tightened.
In order to include this feature it has been proposed that CSN represent unconscious
arrangement of available possibilities and concepts, whereas a conscious process run-
ning in parallel would care about the search and elaboration of novel ones [35] [34].
This is obviously a very important research direction, but still at the stage of wishful
thinking for the time being.
As the reader may remark by looking at the references of this article, CSNs gen-
erated the most recent contributions to the emerging decision theory described herein.
Their attractiveness stems from the fact that they provide a simple explanation of the
mechanisms that may generate certain puzzling findings. The next step would be to
have CSNs that are detailed enough to reproduce decision-making in the complex set-
tings of the real world.
5 Towards a Descriptive and Normative Theory
The theory of rational decision-making has been inundated with criticisms based on
empirical evidence that this is not the way people actually make decisions. Its propo-
nents have objected that, in fact, the theory of rational decision-making is not meant to
16
be a faithful description of what people actually do, but rather a prescription of what
they should do [103]. It is a normative theory, not a descriptive theory. Indeed, since
the time of the story of the fox and the winegrapes, the purpose of having an idea of
“rationality” is that of telling people how they should make their decisions. Whether
people actually conform to rationality principles or do not, this is an empirical question
that does not affect our idea of rationality.
Throughout the previous sections, different streams of thought have been linked to
one another pointing to something like an embryo of a new decision theory, one where
judgments about the likelihood of events (probability) are not disjoined from judgments
about their desirability (utility). The case for this decision theory was made in terms of
its stronger descriptive power with respect to the theory of rational decision-making.
This is quite acceptable for the theory of rational decision-making, since it does not
attack what it really stands for, namely, its power as a normative theory. However, in
the conclusion I would like to speculate whether this embryonic decision theory may
have a normative value as well.
The principles, schemes and models mentioned in the previous sections pictured
decision-making as a process oscillating between tightening and loosening the frame
of discernment, where the final part of the loosening cycle consists of focusing one
one single alternative by contrasting it to a clearly inferior counterpart. This process
does not consist of applying preferences to given alternatives as the theory of ratio-
nal decision-making assumes, but rather of constructing preferences and conceiving
alternatives such that they are coherent with one another. Human minds are viewed as
coherence-seeking machines that make use of available information in order to con-
struct a plausible interpretation of reality, be it scientific theories or social roles. By
drawing causal relationships and eliminating inconsistencies a decision-maker tells
herself a story that explains why certain facts are the way they are and why certain
people did what they did. This story, a founding story that suggests a decision-maker
what it is appropriate to do, is called a narrative.
The construction of a narrative may require that issues that do not fit into the pic-
ture are ignored, downplayed or forgotten. It may require that opinions are changed
even dramatically, and yet their purporters candidly claim that they have always been
coherent, or that they have been coherent if their story is seen from a particular point of
view. Albeit disturbing for our idea of rationality, the extent and easiness with which
human beings distort previous experiences is proven by a number of experiments. It
has been shown that it is easy to induce the subjects of psychological experiments to
change opinion while they are still convinced to have been coherent throughout the
whole experiment [8] [9] [11] [10] [97]. Experiments have shown that people con-
struct coherent narratives of their past, and that they remember past events to the extent
that they fit these narratives [38] [92] [30] [93] [149] [96]. Other experiments have
shown how they may eventually change their interpretation of the past and construct
a new narrative if new evidence must be accommodated [38] [95] [94] [20]. Human
beings are ready to lie to themselves in order to build coherent narratives.
This attitude is puzzling, because distorting reality in order to construct a coherent
narrative is at odds with our idea of rationality. It is what the fox did, and we are
laughing at it since at least three thousand years. So either human nature is inherently
irrational, or our idea of rationality is incorrect. Having a narrative may be so important
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for human decision-making, that nearly any price is worth it.
According to March, re-inventing the past is a crucial ability that enables decision-
makers to conceive new goals and figure out a strategy in an uncertain future [19]
[68]. Later, a similar argument has been made by Weick [147] [148] under the label
of “sensemaking”. Essentially, these authors suggest that in order to make decisions
in the face of an uncertain future it is good to have a narrative that explains the past
as if previous decisions had been made along a coherent line. This line guides the
decision-maker into the future, providing a rationale for action even if certainties are
very few.
In business, politics and other fields, narratives may constitute the bulk of strategies.
Lane and Maxfield have made a years-long field observation of the elaboration and
modification of the narrative of a Silicon Valley firm [56]. This study is very clear
in making us understand that narratives are useful precisely because they provide a
guidance in the face of an uncertain future, and that their usefulness is not impaired
by the fact that their coherence is based on an arbitrary interpretation of reality (see
Appendix D).
So here comes a straightforward argument for normativeness. If seeking coherence
has the purpose of constructing a narrative, and if narratives are useful, then the deci-
sion theory outlined throughout the previous sections should be regarded as rational,
and openly prescribed.
Let us compare the normativeness of this emerging decision theory with the nor-
mativeness of the theory of rational decision. The following passage by Glenn Shafer
is illuminating in this respect:
Just what are the assumptions with empirical content that underlie Sav-
age’s argument for the normativeness of subjective expected utility? There
are at least two. First, the assumption that a person always has well-defined
preferences in those settings where the postulates are applied. Second, the
assumption that a setting can be found that permits a disentanglement of
belief [probability] and value [utility]. 3
Glenn Shafer, [111]
This passage suggests that different decision theories might be normative, depend-
ing on the setting to which they should be applied. Utility maximization might be
normative whenever preferences are defined for the whole possibility set and, further-
more, utility can be evaluated independently of probability. This is certainly the case of
playing dice, but it is not the case of decision-makers facing a future whose possibilities
are only partially known, so that not all preferences can be conceived. In this second
case, it is rational first to tighten the frame of discernment, e.g. enriching it by means
of a sort of brainstorming, then to construct a narrative that isolates one possibility that
is liked and likely at the same time, loosening the frame of discernment.
What should we think of the fox, at the end of this discussion? The issue is whether
the future is known, or not. If the jumping capabilities of the fox are fixed and accu-
rately measured by its attempts to reach the grapes, then the fox should update her
3As in a previous quotation, it is fair to remember that Shafer’s “belief” and “value” cannot be equated to
probability and utility, respectively. Nevertheless, it is a rough approximation that may help understanding.
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evaluation of the probability to reach the grapes, accepting the fact that it cannot reach
them. On the contrary, if its jumping capabilities depend to a large extent on mood,
wind, nutrition and other imponderable factors, then it is better for the fox to convince
itself that the grapes were sour. By doing so, it will try again next time.
It is due to conclude with a warning on the decision theory outlined hitherto. In
fact, recognition of the usefulness of narratives may easily be turned into an invitation
to build and believe whatever narrative, no matter how awkward, crazy and senseless
it is. Narratives are useful because they make us act, but not every action is right. It
is obvious that issuing prescriptions and guidelines is a major task for this emerging
decision theory to gain practical normativeness.
A Ellsberg’s Paradox and Sub-Additive Probabilities
Suppose that a decision-maker is placed in front of two urns, henceforth denoted A and
B. The decision-maker is informed that urn A entails white and black balls in equal
proportion, e.g., urn A may contain 10 white balls and 10 black balls. Regarding urn
B, the decision-maker knows just that it entails white and black balls. Suppose to ask
the decision-maker to evaluate the probability to extract a white ball from urn A and
the probability to extract a white ball from urn B.
Since urn A entails white and black balls in equal proportions, the probability to
extract a white ball from urn A is 0.5. On the contrary, nothing is known regarding the
proportion of white to black balls in urn B. In cases like this, the so-called “principle
of insufficient reason” — i.e. the fact that there is no reason to think otherwise —
suggests to imagine that also urn B entails white and black balls in equal proportions.
Thus, also in this case the probability to extract a white ball is assessed at 0.5. And
yet, something is not in order: intuitively, urn B should be characterized by a greater
uncertainty than urn A!
Ellsberg’s paradox actually deals with the size of the sample on which probabilities
are evaluated. In fact, Ellsberg’s paradox places two extreme situations aside.
In the case of urn A, since we know that it entails white and black balls in equal
proportions we are able to compute probability with infinite precision. It is just like ex-
tracting a ball (and replacing it afterwards) infinite times. We are measuring probability
on a sample of infinite size.
In the case of urn B, lack of knowledge on the proportion of white to black balls
is equivalent to estimating the probability of extracting a white ball prior to any ex-
traction. It means that the probability must be measured on a sample of size zero. We
guess its value at 0.5, but the reliability of our estimate is very low.
The frequentist interpretation of Probability Theory suggests to represent uncer-
tainty by means of two magnitudes. The first one is probability whilst the second one
is sample size. In general, the size of the sample is expressed by a precision indicator.
The subjectivist interpretation of Probability Theory represents uncertainty by means
of one magnitude: probability. The problem highlighted by Ellsberg’s paradox is dealt
in this case by the theory of sub-additive probabilities.
While according to classical probability theory the sum of the probabilities of an
exhaustive set of events must be equal to 1, according to the theory of sub-additive
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Consequence 1 Consequence 2 Consequence 3
Alternative receive $ 2,500 receive $ 2,400 receive nothing
A with prob. 0.33 with prob. 0.66 with prob. 0.01
Alternative receive $ 2,400
B with prob. 1.00
Table 1: The first choice in Allais’ experiment.
probabilities this holds only if probabilities are measured on a sample of infinite size.
In all other cases the probabilities take values such that their sum is smaller than 1.
Let us consider the following example: We are playing dice in a clandestine gam-
bling room. Since we fear that we are playing with an unfair die, we may not assign
probability 1/6 to each face, but rather less, e.g. 1/8. Thus, the sum of the probabil-
ities of all faces is 6× 1/8 = 3/4, which is smaller than 1. Subsequently, if we have
a possibility to throw the die several times — i.e. if we can increase the size of our
sample — we may find out that the die is unfair in the sense that, e.g., face ”2” comes
out with probability 1/3 while the other faces come out with probability 2/15. The sum
of all these probabilities is 5×2/15+1/3 = 2/3+1/3 = 1.
Let us return to Ellsberg’s paradox. In the case of urn A, the probability to extract
a white ball is 0.5 and the probability to draw a black ball is 0.5. The sum of these
probabilities is 1. In the case of urn B, the decision-maker may judge that the proba-
bility to extract a white ball is, for instance, 0.4, and that the probability of extracting a
black ball is also 0.4. The sum of these probabilities is 0.8, but this does not constitute
a problem for the theory.
B Allais’ Paradox and Prospect Theory
Allaiss paradox results from the following experiment. A subject is asked to choose
between the alternatives A and B reported on the rows of table (1). It is empirically
observed that most people choose alternative (B).
Subsequently, the same subjects are confronted with the alternatives C and D re-
ported on the rows of table (2). It is empirically observed that most people choose
alternative (C).
Let us now examine the expected utilities of two pairs of alternatives (A,B) and
(C,D). Preferring (B) to (A) means that u(2,400) > 0.33×u(2,500)+0.66×u(2,400),
which can be written as 0.34×u(2,400) > 0.33×u(2,500). Unfortunately, preferring
(C) to (D) implies the opposite, i.e. that 0.33×u(2,500) > 0.34×u(2,400). So it turns
out that most people do not behave rationally.
Allais’ paradox is due to the presence of a tiny probability of not obtaining anything
in alternative (A). Thus, it is due to aversion to risk.
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Consequence 1 Consequence 2
Alternative receive $ 2,500 receive nothing
C with probability 0.33 with probability 0.67
Alternative receive $ 2,400 receive nothing
D with probability 0.34 with probability 0.66
Table 2: The second choice in Allais’ experiment.
It is possible to introduce non-linear transformations of utilities and probabilities
in order to balance risk aversion. The transformed utilities and probabilities satisfy
expected utility maximization. This extension of the theory of rational decision-making
is called Prospect Theory.
A prospect is a set of pairs {(c1, p1), (c2, p2), . . .}, where c j is a consequence that
will obtain with probability p j. As a preliminary step, prospects with identical conse-
quences are summed, dominated prospects are eliminated and riskless components are
ignored.
Prospects Theory prescribes that the utilities and the probabilities of the above
prospects be transformed according to the following rules:
1. Utility is transformed by means of a non-linear function v = f (u) such that
f ′(u) > 0 and f ′′(u) < 0 for u > 0, f ′(u) > 0 and f ′′(u) > 0 for u < 0, with
| f ′′(u) |u<0 > | f ′′(u) |u>0.
2. Probabilities p are transformed into “weights” w by means of a non-linear func-
tion w = g(p) such that g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1 but ∃p ∈ (0,1) such that ∀p < p
it is g(p)≥ p and ∀p > p it is g(p)≤ p.
3. Weights w are transformed into coefficients q by means of the following rules:
q−−h = w
−(p−h) for j =−h
q−i = w
−(p−h + . . .+ pi)−w−(p−h + . . .+ pi−1) for −h < j ≤ 0
q+i = w
+(pi + . . .+ pk)−w+(pi+1 + . . .+ pk) for 0≤ j < k
q+k = w
+(pk) for j = k
where w− and q− refer to prospects with negative utility, denoted with an index
j ∈ [−h,0], whereas w+ and q+ refer to prospects with positive utility, denoted
with an index j ∈ [0,k].
The v and q obtained at the end of this procedure can be used much like utilities and
probabilities, respectively. Prospect Theory succeeds to eliminate the inconsistencies
highlighted by Allais’ paradox, but it does not explain why it works. It should be called
a heuristic, rather than a theory.
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C Preference Reversal in Slovic’s Paradox
Let us consider a series of bets with different characteristics. For instance, a series of
bets on different horses, or playing on a series of different slot machines, or a series
of unfair dice different from one another. The game consists of choosing to bet on a
specific horse, choosing to play on a specific slot machine or selecting a specific die to
throw. In other words, the game consists of choosing one bet out of a series of bets.
In order to simplify matters, let us consider series composed by two bets. More
specifically, let us consider the four pairs of bets in table (3.
For any pair of bets, subjects are asked to select either bet A or bet B. On average,
the number of subjects who prefer A to B is slightly greater than the number of subjects
who prefer B to A.
At this point, a different game is played. Subjects are asked to imagine that they
own a lottery ticket for each bet, and that they have a possibility to sell it. That is, they
can either wait for the outcome of each bet, where they may win or loose with a certain
probability, or they can sell the ticket. In order to compare the willingness to play to
the willingness to sell the ticket, subjects are asked to fix a minimum selling price for
each bet.
In general, it is empirically observed that most people ask a higher price for bets B
than for bets A.
However, for each pair of bets, bet A has the same expected (utility) value than
bet B. Thus, according to the theory of rational decision, decision-makers should be
indifferent between A and B.
On the contrary, subjects have a slight preference for A if they are asked to play
one of the two bets but they definitely prefer B if they are asked to fix a selling price.
This behavior is clearly at odds with the theory of rational decision.
The distinguishing feature of bets A is that the first consequence has a much higher
probability than the second one. Thus, one assumes that it is the difference of proba-
bility values that orientates decision-making.
The distinguishing feature of bets B is that the first consequence concerns a much
larger amount of money than the second one. Probabilities, on the contrary, are some-
times very similar, sometimes very different from one another. Thus, one assumes that
it is the difference of money values that orientates decision-making.
If subjects are asked to play the bets their attention is caught by probabilities, so
either they are indifferent or they prefer A. If subjects are asked to sell lottery tickets
their attention is caught by money values, so they prefer B.
Slovic’s paradox shows that preferences change if the decision-maker focuses on
the probability of a consequence or, rather, on its utility (here, money value). This
means that human beings are unable to evaluate probabilities and utilities indepen-
dently from one another. We laugh at the fox who says that the grapes are sour, but we
behave in precisely that way.
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PAIR OF BETS I
Consequence 1 Consequence 2
Bet AI win $ 4.00 loose $ 1.00
with probability 0.99 with probability 0.01
Bet BI win $ 16.00 loose $ 2.00
with probability 0.33 with probability 0.67
PAIR OF BETS II
Consequence 1 Consequence 2
Bet AII win $ 3.00 loose $ 2.00
with probability 0.95 with probability 0.05
Bet BII win $ 6.50 loose $ 1.00
with probability 0.50 with probability 0.50
PAIR OF BETS III
Consequence 1 Consequence 2
Bet AIII win $ 2.00 loose $ 1.00
with probability 0.80 with probability 0.20
Bet BIII win $ 9.00 loose $ 0.50
with probability 0.20 with probability 0.80
PAIR OF BETS IV
Consequence 1 Consequence 2
Bet AIV win $ 4.00 loose $ 0.50
with probability 0.80 with probability 0.20
Bet BIV win $ 40.00 loose $ 1.00
with probability 0.10 with probability 0.90
Table 3: Slovic’s experiment.
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D Reconstructing the Past at Echelon
The following case study was carried out by Lane and Maxfield [56]. It shows that
distorting reality and reconstructing the past can be a good and useful thing.
In 1990, Echelon, a Silicon Valley company, launched LonWorks, an innovative
technology for distributed control. Previously, control was centralized into one main
processing unit. With LonWorks, each electrotechnical device is endowed with a micro-
processor and can communicate with all other devices, so all device control each other.
Distributed control is more resilient than centralized control, and easily implements
modular architectures to which additional devices can be added.
Distributed control is particularly suited to the automation of office spaces in large
buildings, post-Fordist productive plants, as well as any setting where a large number
of heterogeneous devices must coordinate their operations while retaining some flexi-
bility. Thus, in its early days Echelon focused on partnerships with large producers of
the devices to be automated, e.g., a producer in the field of heating and air condition-
ing was offered a possibility to integrate a microchip in their devices, as well on lifts,
doors and windows in order to integrate all controls in a large building, from lighting
to heating to theft protection.
With some disappointment, Echelon had to recognize that the LonWorks technology
was not exploited in its full potentialities. In fact, each large producer was specialized
in one tiny sector so it had neither the power nor the capability to implement LonWorks
on all devices. For instance, a producer in the field of heating and air conditioning
found it difficult to install LonWorks on doors, windows, lights and lifts, for the au-
tomation of these devices was covered by other firms. Indeed, the difficulty was that
Echelon was attempting to create a new market — one may call it a market for automa-
tion — in a marketplace that was covered by producers of several physical devices at a
time.
Echelon was conscious of the enormous difficulties connected with the creation of
a new market. Nevertheless, it deemed that long-term relations with a few special-
ized producers would pay in the long run. Echelon had a narrative, saying that large
specialized producers would slowly but persistently adopt and impose LonWorks. Con-
sequently, it invested all of its resources in these relations.
By 1994, Echelon was loosing confidence in this narrative. Echelon started to ap-
proach large system integrators of ICT, such as Olivetti and Ameritech. However, the
crucial move was that of hiring a person for this job, who did not come from Silicon
Valley as all other executives did. Through this employee, Echelon approached smaller
companies, that integrated devices from different producers. Some people at Eche-
lon conceived the idea of embedding LonWorks in a box that could be attached to any
electrotechnical device, of whatever producer.
Scholars of technological innovation know how difficult it is for visionary employ-
ees to convince their boss of the value of their idea. In the case of Echelon the CEO
embraced enthusiastically the new idea, because it appeared to fit with his previous
experience.
Echelon’s CEO had been the successful entrepreneur of a small firm that exploited
digital technologies to produce PBX (private branch exchange) systems with innovative
features. This firm had been able to displace giants such as AT&T by providing small
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independent installers with a superior product. When this CEO met small independent
integrators of electromechanical devices, he mapped the new idea onto his previous
experience.
In 1996, and within a few months, Echelon changed its narrative. Echelon presented
itself as a provider of an innovative microchip for independent system integrators, a
microchip that could be installed on any electrotechnical device, of whatever producer.
Most importantly, Echelon told itself that it had always pursued this strategy. No-
body in the firm seemed to be aware that the firm’s strategy had changed. According
to the narrative that they had developed, they had always done what they were doing.
Moreover, when faced with evidence that the firm had adopted a different strat-
egy, management wished that the final publication by Lane and Maxfield would not
stress this aspect (Lane: personal communication). This makes sense, for according to
our idea of rationality narratives should reflect “objective information”, and decision-
makers should stick to it. Thus, management did not want to appear irrational.
However, the case of Echelon highlights that constructing a narrative by re-interpreting
the past may be good and useful for decision-makers. In fact, the reported case reveals
that by re-interpreting its mission Echelon was able to direct its investments. If the fu-
ture is uncertain, as it is often the case, interpreting the past in order to find a direction
for the future is a sensible activity.
Rather, the trouble is with our idea of rationality. Since re-interpreting the past is
regarded as irrational, then it must be done in secrecy. In reality, if re-interpreting the
past has positive effects, then it should be prescribed.
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